tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-50594322012-01-04T19:45:35.670-06:00Reason is not logic, but rather a Gödelian process. Gödel showed that provability is a weaker notion than truth, no matter what axiom system is involved.Aziz P.noreply@blogger.comBlogger101100tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5059432.post-1167862252991989672007-01-03T15:54:00.000-06:002007-01-03T16:18:22.126-06:00

Welcome to Super-rational, a group discussion in the spirit of Enlightenment values and in celebration of the faculty of Reason. This blog is structured as an extended conversation, where each post is formulated as a response to the previous ones. This post, the INDEX, lists each post in chronological order so that the integrity of this conversation is maintained for a new reader. The Platonia

Aziz P.noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5059432.post-1164761488096378222006-11-28T18:43:00.000-06:002006-12-01T12:24:19.610-06:00

The question of morality came up, but I think it is irrelevant here. Game theory and the PD are about strategy or set of moves, maximization in terms of the constraints of the problem...and in this problem it is to maximize your benefit (money).We'll get back to this problem in a moment. Game theory and strategy can take several forms given the assumptions that are made. If communication is

sourathttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15094907242387299568noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5059432.post-1155693988496653712006-08-15T18:47:00.000-05:002006-12-01T12:03:42.556-06:00

Hofstadter was disappointed in his results--he says, "Cooperate was the answer I was hoping to recieve from everyone.". In the problem definition for the single shot Platonia Dilemma, he deliberately selected individuals who he believed would be superrational. Not a random sample. The answer closest to what i would have done was Scott Buresh's. Hofstadter says, ...he treated his own brain as

Matoko Kusanaginoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5059432.post-1155435903113520682006-08-12T19:46:00.000-05:002006-08-13T17:55:05.746-05:00

As my contribution to this is over two years in waiting, I'm going to step back before zoning in on particulars.For starters, both the Prisoner's Dilemma and Platonia Dilemma are but two idealized, zero-sum games in all of game theory. They are idealized in that they assume the players are all completely rational (or Super-Rational) with substantiated beliefs about what the other players might do

Phlegmnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5059432.post-1082237630464933802004-04-17T15:00:00.000-05:002006-12-01T12:05:10.986-06:00

Aziz writes: I may have read Keith wrongly, but it seems that he explains Hoftstadter's colleagues' defection as a simple function of humans being flawed. Namely, the "right" thing to do was to cooperate, and they were "wrong" to defect. This view is of course founded on the a-priori assumption that cooperation still is the "right" course of action, and any deviation from that course is the

Keith Gillettehttps://profiles.google.com/117491653636751001673noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5059432.post-1081809228525498042004-04-12T17:33:00.000-05:002006-12-01T12:04:37.636-06:00

As Keith noted, the single-shot PD's self-interest matrix is biased towards defection. Note that tit-for-tat is only an optimal strategy for iterated PD, and so it is not really applicable to the single-shot case, since the interaction may never progress to "tat." I may have read Keith wrongly, but it seems that he explains Hoftstadter's colleagues' defection as a simple function of humans being

Aziz P.noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5059432.post-1081230397088546772004-04-05T21:11:00.000-05:002006-12-01T12:04:25.430-06:00

I do so not because I think it'll necessarily bring me the greatest benefit in any given instance but because it's the right thing to do and I was taught to do the right thing.I must grant the possibility (to Kim & Nigel) that if one were to psychoanalyze me, I may only be "doing the right thing" even if it doesn't appear to be in my self-interest by subconsciously performing the hedonistic

Keith Gillettehttps://profiles.google.com/117491653636751001673noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5059432.post-1067692786977838762003-11-01T07:19:00.000-06:002006-12-01T12:03:26.823-06:00

Kim writes below that "Unquestionably in these one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma situations, cooperation is better." - but I can't bring myself to agree. The case of the chocolate donut is a misleading analogy, because ultimately the value of the donut is purely subjective. We aren't talking about competing for an astronaut slot on Space Station Alpha or the last ticket out of Ho Chi Minh city circa

Aziz P.noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5059432.post-1057614589314757652003-07-07T16:49:00.000-05:002006-12-01T12:03:10.663-06:00

It seems to me that Hofstadter was missing a piece, or else that decisionmaking of this kind is based upon iterative layers of rationality. I used to debate with my good friend Nigel about why people choose to do "good." His theory was that doing good resulted in either material or mental benefits to the do-gooder, and so the behavior is inherently selfish. His take was that all behavior is

aravenhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05284945866176870446noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5059432.post-903345402003-02-17T10:42:00.000-06:002006-12-01T12:02:39.793-06:00

I consider myself a reasonably intelligent guy, with rather strong opinions, and a sufficient amount of self-criticism. Note the presence of moderating adjectives in every sub-phrase - reasonably, rather, sufficient. Like a moth to flame, therefore, I am always drawn to writing by those I admire for the same qualities, only more so (without the adjectives). One of these is Kim, a dear

Aziz P.noreply@blogger.com0